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
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
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THE SIXTEENTH NATION:

Spain's Role in NATO

WILLIAM L. HEIBERG



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THE SIXTEENTH NATION

Spain's Role in NATO

by


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
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FOREWORD

In 1982, Spain became the first nation in more than a quarter of a century to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This historic event, however, has not silenced discussion on the implications of Spanish membership for the future of this security alliance. The author of this monograph, Colonel William L. Heiberg, US Army, aids this discussion by examining the differing objectives of NATO, the United States, and Spain.

The author examines the benefits accruing to the alliance as a result of Spanish membership. From the military standpoint, Spanish ground, naval, and air forces will moderately increase NATO strength. Spanish territory adds substantially to NATO's rear area for conventional war-fighting purposes. Other gains are longer-range and more geopolitical in nature: possible improved relations with the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America; a bolstering of the image of NATO as a viable alliance; and new strategic options for NATO planners. On the other hand, were Spain to withdraw from the alliance—perhaps as a result of Spanish politics—the damage may outweigh the gains offered by NATO's "sixteenth nation."

The political climate has changed somewhat since Colonel Heiberg wrote this study in 1982 as an NDU Senior Research Fellow; for example, the election of a socialist president has rekindled the Spanish debate on NATO membership. Thus, the implications for Western security of Spain's NATO membership cannot yet be fully understood. This analysis of the key issues is therefore a timely contribution to the continuing dialogue on NATO goals and strategies stimulated by the inclusion of Spain in the alliance.



JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
President, NDU

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Colonel William L. Heiberg, USA, holds a bachelor of science degree from the US Military Academy (USMA) at West Point and a master of arts degree in international politics from Columbia University. He has taught political science in the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, where he was also Executive Secretary for the annual nationwide Student Conference on US Affairs. Other tours of duty include a 2-year assignment in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) where Colonel Heiberg was an Assistant for NATO standardization, and 2 years at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe where he was Project Officer for the "Autumn Forge" exercise series. Colonel Heiberg was a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1981-82 when he researched this project; at the same time he completed his requirements as a student at the National War College, NDU. Following his graduation, he joined the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, recently redesignated the "US Central Command," and is Director of the command's Washington Liaison Office in the Pentagon. Colonel Heiberg is being assigned to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he will command the Field Artillery School Support Brigade.

PREFACE

I am indebted to the National Defense University for the opportunity to participate in the Senior Research Fellowship program, which enabled me to conduct meaningful research into an area of interest and importance to the national security community. This program has contributed to the dialogue on important defense issues, not only within the military but between government officials and civilians in the private sector. In particular, I would identify Colonel Frank Margiotta, Director, NDU Research Directorate, for his whole-hearted support in helping me address some of the politically sensitive issues involved in my research; and Colonel Fred Kiley, Associate Director and Professor of Research, who provided many thoughtful comments in improving the substance of my monograph, and suggested more effective ways to convert thoughts into the written language. Ms. Rebecca Miller, lead editor, and Mr. George Maerz of the NDU Research Directorate editorial staff have provided invaluable assistance in helping to improve the accuracy and organization of this monograph, and in pushing it through the publication process.

The endnotes do not reflect the substantial amount of material and ideas I received from US officials in Washington and in the following: NATO Headquarters, Brussels; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, Mons, Belgium; Allied Command, Atlantic, Norfolk; Headquarters, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, Naples; Headquarters, Iberian Atlantic Command, Lisbon; US Embassies, Madrid and Lisbon; and Headquarters, US European Command, Stuttgart. I particularly appreciate the thoughtful assistance and advice from Rear Admiral Sayre A. Swarztrauber, former Co-Chairman of the

US-Spanish Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, and Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, National War College faculty.

Ultimately, of course, I take full responsibility for this manuscript and for any errors or omissions. As the issue of Spain's role in NATO continues to be quite sensitive, I would like to emphasize that nothing contained herein should be construed as representing the official view of the US government or any of its agencies.

WILLIAM L. HEIBERG

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the 1975 death of Generalissimo Franco, Spain began to emerge from many decades of relative isolation and gradually became aligned with the Western world. A bilateral US-Spanish treaty helped pave the way for Spain to make a decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in early 1982 as the sixteenth nation in the alliance.

Spain's accession to NATO theoretically brings a potential increase to the allied forces in the magnitude of over a quarter of a million men organized into five ground divisions, a navy which includes nearly 40 principal combatant ships including a small aircraft carrier, and an air force with 11 fighter-bomber squadrons. These gains, however, are more apparent than real, for the Spanish military has been organized primarily for security of Spanish territory without an appreciable capability to project the forces into the most likely battlegrounds of a future war in Europe. Furthermore, any realistic appraisal of the East-West balance in recent years would have recognized that Spain, while technically neutral, could be counted as a Western nation. Therefore, Spain's entry into NATO does not mark a major breakthrough in tangible military terms.

The significance of Spanish membership in the alliance is primarily geopolitical. The size and strategic location of Spain opens up an array of options for military planners in terms of forward positioning of equipment and forces, staging areas and enroute facilities, and lines of communications. Furthermore, the inclusion of the Spanish land mass in allied war plans allows for a greater strategic depth to the battlefield for use in both defensive and offensive operations. A most impor-

tant aspect of the Spanish decision to join the alliance is the political signal to East and West alike: contrary to various indications that the alliance is in disarray, NATO is still a viable, healthy, and growing organization.

Although Spain has made the political decision to join the alliance, the process of military integration will take a lengthy period. Spain's role must be determined within the context of the bilateral military relationship which exists with the United States as well as the requirements of NATO. While the stated and implied objectives of NATO, the United States, and Spain differ and sometimes conflict, sufficient common ground exists to define where Spanish commands and forces might best fit within the allied organizational structure.

Subsequent to the completion of this monograph, the Spanish Socialist Party, under the leadership of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, has become the majority party in the Spanish parliament. It has become apparent that Spain will not immediately jump into any entangling military arrangements within NATO, particularly in view of campaign promises to revisit this decision and conduct a national referendum on the issue. Assuming that Spain eventually affirms its membership in NATO, Spanish accession could be a major milestone in the evolution of European military cooperation and political integration.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCHAN	Allied Command, Channel
ACE	Allied Command, Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command, Atlantic
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces, Southern Region
AMF	Allied Command, Europe, Mobile Force
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
AWACS	Airborne Early-Warning and Control System
BISCLANT	Biscay Command, Atlantic
CD	Democratic Coalition (of Spain)
CINCEASTLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic Com- mand
CINCCHAN	Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command
CINCIBERLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Com- mand
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, Southern Region
COMAIRSOUTH	Commander, Air Command, Southern Region
CONUS	Continental United States
EEC	European Economic Community
ETA	Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque terrorist or- ganization)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBERLANT	Iberian Atlantic Command
LTDP	Long-Term Defense Program
MEDOC	Western Mediterranean Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVOCFORMED ...	Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PSOE	Socialist Party of Spain
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
STANAVFORLANT ..	Standing Naval Force, Atlantic
UCD	Union of the Democratic Center (of Spain)

1. THE ALLIANCE IN 1982

INTRODUCTION

In late 1975 Generalissimo Franco died and Spain began its long-awaited transformation into a modern democracy. Within two months the United States and Spain signed a treaty which essentially extended and upgraded a series of earlier military agreements between the two countries. In a resolution of June 21, 1976 accompanying the US ratification of the treaty, the Senate expressed its anticipation of "Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

The treaty included provisions designed to bring Spanish defense policies more in line with those of NATO; as its expiration date approached, Spain applied for membership in the alliance. In early 1982, the various parliamentary bodies of NATO nations addressed the question of Spanish accession, and for the first time in more than a quarter of a century, NATO began the process of adding a member. (Addition of any new member requires ratification by each existing member, which, in most cases, takes parliamentary or Congressional approval. Twelve members signed the NATO Charter in 1949; Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by Germany in 1955.)

This monograph identifies the role Spain might assume in NATO and also attempts to determine what Spain's membership means to the alliance.

Since the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan in 1979, NATO has entered a period which, by some accounts, is the begin-

ning of the end of the alliance. This crisis, however, may be just one more in a continuous series as the Western political-military coalition continues to adjust to a rapidly evolving world. To view Spain's entry into NATO in some perspective, some of the more important trends which Spanish membership may affect must be mentioned.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London concludes that the East-West balance of conventional forces

has slowly but steadily moved in favour of the East. At the same time, the West has largely lost the technological edge which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers.¹

While the strategic balance cannot be so easily summarized, the current assessment is that the United States and the Soviet Union maintain "essential equivalence," or in the words of noted defense analyst John M. Collins, "assured anxiety."²

NEW DIMENSIONS TO NATO CONCERNS

NATO's scope of interest has expanded. European nations have begun to comprehend the impact that events in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf area have upon allied security; and the participation of France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in the multinational peace-keeping force in the Sinai is evidence of the willingness of some NATO nations to respond militarily to non-NATO problems. The alliance itself, however, demonstrated by both its relatively limited response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and by its slow, ineffective reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland that it is not designed to react to threats outside of the NATO countries. Individual members are watching the events in the Middle East and North Africa with concern. Many leaders and governments recognize that Soviet advances in these areas are posing a threat to peace, yet the structure of NATO and the political climate within some

of its member nations continue to make it difficult for NATO to deal with out-of-area threats.

ISSUES WITHIN NATO

In addition to these non-NATO problems, the following eight issues within the alliance have stimulated controversy and disunity:

Burden sharing. The contributions of some allied nations to NATO have not kept pace with their economic growth. The United States, in particular, has been pressing for a more equitable distribution of the defense burden in terms of men and materiel, and Germany has become increasingly sensitive to the demands for stockpiling weapons, stationing allied troops, and conducting maneuvers and exercises on German soil. Spain's resources, including its land, will influence the deliberations concerning burden sharing.

Intermediate range nuclear weapons. In spite of a 1979 NATO decision to modernize theater nuclear weapons, the agreement to deploy the improved weapons has been limited. Popular opposition to the implementation of the 1979 decision has spread across the countries of NATO, and anti-nuclear sentiment in the US, stimulated by the controversial proposal in the spring of 1982 of McGeorge Bundy et al. to move toward a policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons, has reached new levels.³ The "zero-option" proposal of President Reagan, which has failed to elicit a satisfactory response from the Soviets, temporarily reduced the volume of European opposition concerning this issue; but as the 1983 deployment date approaches, the debate will probably increase in intensity, particularly in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Spanish anti-nuclear sentiment, discussed in chapter 2, will undoubtedly surface during this debate.

Enhanced radiation blast weapons. The US decision to develop the enhanced radiation weapon, commonly referred

to as the neutron bomb, further disrupted the alliance. Although the allies recognized that the production decision was a US prerogative, they have been disturbed by the unilateral American move to manufacture this highly unpopular weapon which they perceive will be used solely in the European environment. This issue may provoke anti-American sentiment in Spain as its population becomes more aware of US policies and capabilities.

Strategic deterrence. The above two issues have created considerable new doubt concerning the credibility of the American strategic deterrent. Meanwhile, partly because of the growing realization that the requirements for nuclear deterrence sometimes compete with—and even conflict with—the needs for a conventional war-fighting capability, questions of the grand strategy of the alliance have come to the forefront. This, in turn, has shaken the strategy of the alliance by raising new, more searching questions about the doctrine of flexible response. Spain will undoubtedly provide new perspectives in what has become the first real debate on this doctrine since its adoption.

Reduction of forces. United States requirements in Southwest Asia have resulted in the reduction of aircraft carrier battle groups available to practice and implement NATO plans. Also, as a consequence of the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which threatens the diversion of necessary reinforcements to areas outside the European theater, the Europeans perceive a further diminishing of US capabilities in Europe. Similarly, the April 1982 inclusion of NATO-committed forces in the British deployment to the Falkland Islands provided evidence of the vulnerability of the alliance to national decisions affecting force commitments. Modernization programs slipped throughout NATO, and economic considerations drove Britain to make major reductions in its shipbuilding programs. Belgium cancelled a biannual corps exercise in 1980, and several nations reduced or withdrew commitments to various NATO maneuvers. Spanish mili-

tary modernization efforts may help provide a positive counterweight to such negative trends.

Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP). According to the 1982 Defense Department Report to Congress, progress toward the ten priority objectives of the LTDP has been slow. Included in the reported areas of weakness are objectives which Spain can help meet, such as stockage of war reserve ammunition and fuels, mining and mine countermeasures, and the provision of additional European reserve brigades.⁴

Host nation support. Current host nation support agreements are not adequate to take care of reinforcement plans already in existence, much less the significantly greater requirements which the Rapid Reinforcement Plan entails. The Secretary of Defense has reported progress in conducting bilateral agreements with the European nations.⁵ These negotiations have undoubtedly introduced another source of tension in the alliance. Spanish bases with NATO troops will raise further questions concerning host nation support.

Southern flank problems. Turkey, the only NATO member other than Norway which borders the Soviet Union, also controls Soviet egress from the Black Sea. Turkey's security is essential for the allied defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and is a key element in the defensive plan for the entire Southern Region. Economically, Turkey is the weakest member of NATO. Yet Turkey maintains over a half-million men under arms, and its 1981 defense expenditure of approximately \$2.6 billion ranked that country among the highest in the alliance in percentage of gross domestic product allocated to defense.⁶ Some military analysts consider major cuts in the Turkish force structure essential to help redress the critical economic situation.⁷

Across the Aegean, Greece is posing a problem of a different nature. Premier Papandreou initially threatened to withdraw from the alliance; he may disavow the "Rogers

Agreement'' for the return of Greece to the NATO integrated military structure; he blocked the issuance of the Ministerial Communique after the December 1981 Defense Ministers' meeting in Brussels; and he failed to join the rest of NATO in its condemnation of martial law in Poland. These actions, coupled with the continued hostility between Greece and Turkey, have eroded the cohesion of the Southern Region. Spain's geographic position may influence the policies and politics of NATO's southern flank.

The problems identified above are certainly not the only ones faced by the alliance; however, they help define some of the NATO issues which Spain's entry may affect. The next chapter briefly defines Spain's potential, then chapter 3 builds on the discussion of NATO issues by defining NATO and US objectives more specifically, while chapter 4 focuses on Spain's objectives relating to NATO membership.

2. SPAIN'S POTENTIAL

Spain is the second largest nation in Western Europe and the third largest in NATO. Including its island possessions, Spain has an area of nearly 200,000 square miles, slightly smaller than France and about two-thirds the size of Turkey. Its population of 38 million ranks sixth in NATO. Although accession to the alliance does not significantly alter the East-West military balance, Spanish entry into NATO provides a range of possibilities to improve the military posture of the West. This chapter summarizes some of the factors relevant to Spain's role in NATO.

GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS

Until the twentieth century, the strategic location of the Iberian peninsula has had a major influence on the course of Western civilization. Historically, Spain has been politically oriented toward the Atlantic and the Americas at least as much as it has been toward the Mediterranean and Europe, and Spain has maintained close ties with Africa and the Middle East. Although Spain was not directly involved in either of the world wars, the interest of Hitler in gaining Spain as an ally, and the efforts by Roosevelt to assure Spanish neutrality underline the continuing significance of Spain in the era of modern warfare.¹ In the context of the international scene of the 1980's, the geographic position of Spain remains pivotal.

The Iberian peninsula provides NATO forces with the badly needed depth for any conflict in Europe (as well as for potential wars outside the NATO area, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southwest Asia). As the United




Figure 1: Spain and its Possessions

States recognized early in the development of post-World War II political and military policy, Spain offers tremendous opportunities, not only for the positioning of reinforcements and equipment, but also for staging movements of personnel and materiel into the battle area.² Spain's inclusion in the alliance will increase the security of the lines of communication between America and Europe and will improve the integrity of the NATO air defense system. Spain also provides relatively safe territory for airfields and headquarters which will complement existing facilities elsewhere in NATO. Essentially, Spain is perceived as a platform from which allies can prepare for, launch, and sustain strategic operations against the Warsaw Pact forces even if forward defense were to fail.

Spain's peninsular location, magnified by its possession of the Canary Islands astride the vital oil tanker routes between the Indian Ocean and Europe, is of overriding maritime significance. Its commanding position flanking the Strait of Gibraltar will be crucial in any conceivable East-West war scenario. Spain's thousand-mile Mediterranean coastline, projected eastward 200 miles by the Balearic Islands, greatly enhances the ability of NATO to maintain control of the western Mediterranean basin and allows the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Region (CINCSOUTH), to concentrate naval assets in the more vulnerable central and eastern areas. Additionally, the oceanic coasts of Spain offer improved control over the Bay of Biscay and access routes to both the English Channel and transatlantic shipping lanes.³

The political implications of Spain's membership are directly related to its geographical location. Warsaw Pact perceptions and calculations are undoubtedly affected by an alliance that is nearly 20 percent larger in area (excluding North America and Iceland) and which represents a more completely united Western Europe. Furthermore, Spain provides a bridge to the African and South American continents and enhances existing ties between NATO and the Middle East. These political links clearly increase NATO's ability to deter war.

POPULATION

Spain's population accounts for over 10 percent of the European NATO total, and its gross domestic product, at over 7 percent of the European NATO total, suggests that the increase Spain offers to the military power of NATO is marginal.⁴ Despite its large population, Spain has fewer people per square mile than any other European NATO country except Turkey and Norway. Spanish society lacks homogeneity, and descriptions often refer to "two Spains," one traditionalist and sometimes reactionary, and the other liberal and sometimes radical. In reality, Spain's population is much more complex than this two-dimensional image suggests. One of the most

striking features of recent Spanish history has been the struggle for autonomy within some of its 50 provinces. Regional loyalties and public dissatisfaction with the government's failure to stem Basque terrorism tend to create an atmosphere of instability which continues to threaten the viability of Spain as a democratic nation.⁵

During the last two decades, the demographic patterns of Spain reflected significant changes in the nation's societal structure. As the country industrialized, tens of thousands of people migrated to the cities; today, only one-fourth of the Spanish labor force works on farms, while nearly half is employed in urban industries. This evolution caused many economic and social strains which nurtured the rapid growth of the Spanish Socialist Party. At the same time, urbanization tended to blur some of the traditional divisions within the country and contributed to a literacy rate which has climbed to 97 percent.⁶

Spain's many years of relative isolation have resulted in a low level of Spanish public knowledge of, or interest in, European politics. At the time of Spain's petition to join the alliance, a poll revealed that over 25 percent of the Spanish people did not even understand what NATO was. The same poll indicated that less than 20 percent supported accession.⁷ The significance of this poll should not be overemphasized, however, for results probably reflected the widespread anti-NATO campaign orchestrated by the Spanish Socialist Party during the 1981 public debate on NATO entry rather than any deep-seated popular opposition.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The evolution of democracy in Spain since Franco's death has been a fascinating process which this paper will address only superficially. As indicated above, Spain's social patterns are very complex; this trait was evident in the first national elections conducted in 1977 when 156 political parties offered

candidates for election to the Spanish parliament, the Cortes. Most of these parties represented splinter groups with narrow regional interests. The four most influential are as follows:

- *The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)*. As its name implies, the UCD is a coalition of various factions in the center of the political spectrum. The UCD won 165 of the 350 seats in the lower house of the Cortes in 1977 and marginally increased its strength to 167 seats in 1979. Although the UCD, with varying degrees of support from smaller parties, has managed to maintain control of the government, in early 1981 Prime Minister Suarez resigned because of his inability to resolve some of Spain's gravest problems: inflation, unemployment, Basque terrorism, and continued difficulties in negotiating Common Market membership. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo replaced him, and the UCD subsequently experienced a series of crises with members from both the right and the left defecting which eroded the party strength to about 150 seats by early 1982. Calvo-Sotelo identified the steps toward Spain's entry into NATO as "the main lines of our foreign policy," and he hopes to develop popular support for alliance membership before the upcoming national elections.⁸
- *The Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE)*. Under the dynamic leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, the PSOE, which currently has 121 seats in the Cortes, would probably win if elections took place in 1982. Gonzalez has been active in foreign affairs, and his party has consistently opposed alliance membership for Spain, but not NATO itself. Although he has been very critical of Spain's relationship with the United States, he met with US Secretary of State Haig in early 1982 and commented that "our positions are different but they are not antagonistic ... and so not totally incompatible."⁹ The PSOE retreated from a promise to withdraw from NATO should

it come into power but pledged to hold a national referendum at some time in the future on the issue.

- *The Communist Party of Spain (PCE)*. The PCE, which holds 22 seats in the Cortes, has had serious internal problems and defections. Among the most independent parties in the Eurocommunist movement, it broke from Moscow's leadership after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and has been highly critical of the Soviet role in establishing martial law in Poland.¹⁰ The PCE consistently opposed Spain's bilateral ties with the United States, and it supported the PSOE campaign against Spanish accession to the alliance.
- *The Democratic Coalition (CD)*. On the right end of the spectrum, the CD reflects the persistent influence of the Francoists and other conservative elements of Spanish society. Although it won only nine Cortes seats in 1979, an unexpected right-wing victory in the 1981 regional elections in Galicia suggests that the CD may be gaining grassroots support.¹¹ The CD has been supportive of many UCD programs, including NATO membership.

ECONOMY

A gross domestic product (GDP) of \$192 billion ranks Spain seventh in the alliance, but the GDP per capita drops Spain to 12th, higher than only Greece, Portugal, and Turkey.¹² Spain's real growth averaged 7 percent per year from 1965 to 1974, but hovered at about 2 percent in subsequent years, reflecting the world-wide economic slowdown. Spain has been plagued by double-digit inflation for most of the last decade, and its balance of payments deficit reached \$13.4 billion in 1980. This deficit, caused primarily by the increase in the cost of imported oil, may be offset in the next few years by exploitation of newly-found natural gas deposits in the Gulf of Cadiz.¹³

Despite current economic problems, Spain has resources and industrial potential which could be valuable to NATO. Principal Spanish exports to the United States, for instance, include such militarily-useful products as rubber tires, motor vehicle parts, footwear, and iron and steel sheets. Although Spain is a net importer of foodstuffs, the largest volume of worldwide Spanish exports is in the agricultural field, and such items as citrus fruits and fresh vegetables could contribute to the sustenance of allied combat forces.

Spain has a growing weapons industrial base and is currently producing its own mechanized Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the BMR-600, which is reportedly as good as any equivalent vehicle in NATO. Spain is also producing the French AMX-30 tank under license. Spanish shipbuilding and repair facilities are among the best in Europe, and Spain has, for several years, provided depot-level maintenance for both US and Spanish aircraft. Spain's rather intensive automotive industry also has considerable military potential.¹⁴

For many years, Spain looked toward membership in the European Economic Community (EEC or the Common Market) as a key to sustaining Spanish economic growth. This membership was initially blocked by post-World War II resentments and anti-Franco sentiments in Europe; not until after Franco's death did Spain formally apply to join the EEC. Already beset with many economic difficulties, some Common Market members are concerned about harmful competition from cheaper Spanish labor and agricultural products, factors which caused France to veto Spanish entry in 1980. Following the process which brought Greece into the EEC in early 1981, Common Market leaders are now attempting to develop reduced tariff formulas which will be acceptable both to Spain and EEC members. In early 1982, the EEC invited Spain to embark on a new stage of political cooperation with the Common Market by attending meetings before and after ministerial sessions. Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo heralded this invitation as a major step toward Spanish membership in the Common Market, targeted for early 1984.¹⁵

MILITARY FACTORS

Spain, although officially neutral during the two world wars, has a history tightly bound with the military.¹⁶ While its peninsular isolation permits a degree of natural protection not enjoyed by other Western European nations, Spain continuously devotes almost a quarter of the central government budget to defense.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *Military Balance, 1982/1983*, in manning and spending levels Spanish armed forces rank sixth and seventh, respectively, in relation to other NATO countries. About 0.9 percent of its population is under arms; this is slightly above the NATO-wide average. Compared to the 3.8 percent average of other European NATO nations, Spain's 1981 defense budget of almost \$4 billion represented about 1.9 percent of its GDP, half the European average. Defense Minister Oliart has projected a steady defense budget of 2.04 percent of the GDP for the remainder of the decade.¹⁷

Spain has a system of conscripted service for men at age 20, with a period of 15-18 months of service followed by reserve status until age 38. Over a third of a million Spanish men are on active duty, and approximately 1.5 million are in the reserves.

Three-fourths of the military force is in Spain's 255,000-man army. The army consists of five divisions and numerous smaller-sized units, and is organized to facilitate formation of a three-division corps plus two mountain divisions. Designed to provide territorial protection for Spain and its possessions, the army has virtually no capability to project its forces into Central Europe. By NATO standards, the Spanish army is not well equipped, and its fleet of some 900 tanks consists primarily of American M-47's and M-48's and includes 210 AMX-30's. Most of the Army equipment is US- or French-manufactured and is generally interoperable with that of other NATO nations.

The Spanish navy, which is charged with the protection of Spanish coasts and islands, has 40 principal combatant ships: 11 destroyers, 20 frigates, 8 submarines, and an old US aircraft carrier which can hold 7 Harriers or 24 helicopters. Through a modernization program, it will be replaced by a new one of equivalent capability in 1984, and there will be an addition of a second carrier later in the decade. Also, 3 more frigates, 8 corvettes, and 2 submarines are programmed for commissioning in the mid-1980's. The 54,000-man navy includes 11,000 marines and a large number of amphibious warfare landing vessels as well as a wide variety of mine sweeping and laying, anti-submarine, coastal patrol, and support craft.¹⁸ Additionally, the Spanish merchant fleet, consisting of nearly 500 registered ships, is the fifth largest in Western Europe.¹⁹ Collectively these maritime forces have a capability which could positively influence a maritime conflict in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

The Spanish air force of 38,000 men has some 210 combat aircraft organized into 11 fighter-bomber squadrons. The inventory includes F-4C's, F-5's, Mirage III-EE's, and a few Mirage F-1's; Spain is planning to modernize its air force with the purchase of over a hundred new fighters (F-16's, F-18's, or Mirage 2000's).²⁰ The air force is designed to provide air defense and tactical air support for ground and naval forces, but it has little capability to conduct long-range operations or to airlift cargo and personnel.

In 1977 Spain upgraded its air defenses with the inauguration of the *Combat Grande*. This system includes long-range radars and improved communications, and it ties in with Spanish Nike Hercules and Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile units. The *Combat Grande* is completely compatible with the NATO air defense network which includes the NATO AWACS, and it can be connected with the French "Strida II" air defense system.²¹

The armed forces are organized under a coordinating staff, the National Defense Junta, which has only a limited

capability for joint planning. The military primarily operates by individual service at the military region level, and much of its effort, particularly in the army, focuses on internal security operations. The role of some army leaders in the aborted coup of February 1981 reflects the traditional and continuing involvement of the Spanish military in political affairs.

In December 1981, a "Manifesto of 100," signed by junior army officers and noncommissioned officers, expressed sympathy for the instigators of the 1981 coup attempt. This may have contributed to a subsequent shakeup of the military hierarchy, which culminated in the replacement of the chairman of the Defense Junta and his three service chiefs in early 1982. Persistent reports suggest that a clandestine military union, opposed to the democratic Spanish regime, is trying to build support for a rightist *putsch* against the government.²²

A factor in the military unrest has apparently been the Spanish government's decision to enter the alliance. One of the grievances listed in the "Manifesto of 100" criticized "antinational politicization of the major defense issues—such as our joining NATO."²³ Evidence suggests that many army officers perceive that a NATO mission may undermine their traditional claim to national power, and they are not enthusiastic about alliance membership. The air force and naval officers who have been somewhat more involved in dealings with other European officials, as well as with American forces in Spain, appear to be somewhat more supportive of a Spanish role in NATO.²⁴

Although Spain has been generally isolated from NATO, various military links with allied members exist. During the 1936–39 Spanish Civil War, Mussolini dispatched more than 50,000 Italian soldiers as well as air and naval units to assist Franco's Nationalist forces. The infamous German Condor Legion of bombers also supported Franco, while more than 2,000 US volunteers joined the International Brigade of the losing Republican Army. A feeling of long-standing affiliation

between Spain and Germany persists, and a few veterans of the volunteer "Blue Division," which fought with the *Wehrmacht* on the Russian front from 1941 to 1943, are still on active duty. The Iberian Pact of 1942, which linked Spain and Portugal, has evolved into a mutual defense treaty, and Spanish army units periodically conduct exercises with the Portuguese. The proximity of Spain to France has led to limited military cooperation, as well as to the infusion of some French equipment into Spain's army, navy, and air force.

By far, the most significant foreign influence on Spain has come from the United States in the form of arms sales, military training, and military aid. The 1953 US-Spanish Pact of Madrid, which eventually evolved into the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, constituted a formal alliance short of a mutual defense agreement. Most military hardware in all three services is of US origin, and thousands of Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers have trained at US military schools. In return, the Spanish have allowed the United States to construct and use four major bases (three of which the United States now actively uses), and nearly 9,000 American troops, mostly airmen, are stationed in Spain.²⁵ This bilateral relationship has strongly influenced the development of the Spanish military forces over the past three decades.

Until Spain presented its petition to NATO for membership in November 1981, only a few contacts with the alliance existed. Spanish naval elements have occasionally participated in NATO exercises, and NATO authorities have invited Spanish observers to several Southern Region maneuvers. As agreed in the 1976 Treaty, the United States and Spain organized a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, primarily for the purpose of integrating Spanish and NATO contingency planning. As an adjunct to this staff, Spain established a small tri-service liaison office at the US European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

Spain's potential does not immediately translate to a great gain for the alliance for two reasons: much of that potential will not be realized for many years, and currently available capabilities have already been considered assets to the West because of Spain's long defense relationship with the United States. The clear identification of Spain as part of NATO, however, does make for a more precise definition of possible Spanish contributions and provides the opportunity to begin developing Spanish potential immediately. But before Spain's role in the alliance can be examined, Spanish objectives must be compared and contrasted with both those of NATO and the United States.

3. NATO AND US OBJECTIVES

Specifying NATO objectives beyond those spelled out in the Charter is difficult because the diversified nature of the alliance virtually precludes the agreement of all members concerning any particular political problem. Even the definition of US national objectives which applies to a specific issue is an imprecise process because it relies on subjective interpretations of official and unofficial sources. Fully recognizing these difficulties, this chapter identifies general objectives of both NATO and the United States which relate to the role of Spain within the Atlantic alliance.

NATO OBJECTIVES

To demonstrate the solidarity and health of the alliance. As noted in chapter 1, a number of developments have combined in the past few years to undermine the image of NATO and to threaten its very existence. As the alliance enters its fourth decade, NATO wants to demonstrate to friend and foe alike that it is still a viable coalition and an organization which continues to embody the collective determination of free democratic nations to resist aggression. Spanish membership provides a sign that NATO has not outlived its usefulness but continues to be a relevant force in the international scene of the 1980's. Furthermore, in light of earlier opposition of member nations to Franco's Spain, Spanish accession represents an important achievement for the fundamental democratic principles of the alliance.

To enhance deterrence through a more credible combat posture. Several aspects of this objective which Spanish membership in NATO affects are as follows:

- **Defense in depth.** The 1965 withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure seriously weakened the combat posture of the alliance. NATO needs air, land, and sea bases to the rear of the battle area for both peacetime and wartime positioning of forces. Rear area supply and maintenance depots are also critically required, as are sites for headquarters and communication facilities well behind the combat zone. Additionally, allied commanders need strategic depth in order to develop and execute the maneuver and counterattack plans essential to implement the doctrine of forward defense.
- **Deployment of nuclear weapons.** The implementation of the 1979 NATO decision to modernize intermediate-range nuclear weapons has been divisive, with only Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom agreeing to their emplacement. The vast expanse of the Iberian peninsula presents the possibility of stationing theater nuclear weapons in Spain, although range limitations suggest that this is not presently a realistic option. Spain also has vast potential for the storage of ground, sea, and air deliverable tactical nuclear weapons. (This study addresses Spanish attitudes on the nuclear issue on pages 38-39.)
- **Implementation of the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP).** NATO's 1978 blueprint for achieving force goals highlights the most critical areas of deficiency in the alliance. As noted in chapter 1, progress has been particularly slow in ammunition and fuel stockage, mining and mine countermeasures, and the provision of additional reserve brigades. With the Spanish maritime capabilities in mine warfare and the large numbers of Spaniards on reserve status, Spain has the potential to contribute in each of these areas and to the construction of NATO storage facilities.

- Improved maritime control. The growing Soviet naval presence in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean poses a threat requiring the buildup of allied naval resources and merchant shipping.¹ The range of Spanish maritime capabilities includes naval and merchant fleets, ports, ship repair facilities, and geographic sea-lane control points. Additionally, use of Spanish airfields for sea surveillance missions can enhance NATO maritime control capabilities. Such improvements to NATO's naval capabilities are of possible value to the Supreme Allied Commanders of both Europe and the Atlantic, as well as to the Commander-in-Chief of the English Channel.
- Enhanced air defenses. NATO is not well protected from a possible air attack from the south. Regional instability in northern Africa could lead to exposure of NATO facilities in Iberia as well as the vital Atlantic and Mediterranean shipping lanes. Spanish air defenses, if incorporated into the existing NATO air defense system, can help protect NATO's southern and southwestern flanks.
- Improved capability to reinforce the Southern Region. The southern flank of NATO is vulnerable to Warsaw Pact attacks through the Middle East and the Mediterranean as well as from adjacent communist nations. In addition to Spanish forces, which can be included in reinforcement plans, the Iberian peninsula provides potential staging areas and access routes for reinforcing forces from America and other allied nations.
- Improved Spanish defense programs. Through the Defense Planning Questionnaire process, NATO authorities annually review each member's force structure and contribution to the alliance. NATO will undoubtedly request major improvements in Spanish military equipment, training, and organization. Additionally, the

NATO-wide policy to increase national defense budgets by 3 percent each year, admittedly not satisfied by most member nations, will apply to Spain.

To maintain current NATO boundaries. It is clear that no consensus exists to expand NATO's geographic area in any direction, and Warsaw Pact nations will probably argue that any attempt to enlarge NATO will violate the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki accords.² While the NATO Charter does encompass "the Algerian Department of France," two decades ago the North Atlantic Council agreed that Algeria's independence made that provision irrelevant. Both the Canaries and the Balearics, as well as the Chafarinas and Alboran islands off the coast of Morocco, fall within the area of NATO as defined by the Charter. Inclusion of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the coast of Africa, however, will require a unanimous amendment of the Charter, a divisive process which will be highly unlikely to succeed.

To respect sensitivities of all member nations. During the various debates on Spanish membership which took place in national parliaments, several bilateral issues between Spain and other members surfaced. Given the veto power of each member, it will be difficult to incorporate Spain into the alliance in such a way that any member's position on a bilateral issue will be compromised. These issues include the following:

- **Status of Gibraltar.** Since the British Navy conquered the two-plus square mile territory of Gibraltar in 1704, the status of that British colony has been a continuing irritant to UK-Spanish relationships. Over 99 percent of the 28,000 residents want to maintain their British citizenship, and the UK response to the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands suggests that Great Britain will not easily yield to the Spanish claims of sovereignty over Gibraltar. A recent British parliamentary report recommended that the United Kingdom not prevent

Spanish forces from being stationed in the Gibraltar base under a NATO flag, but this recommendation stimulated considerable controversy in London and was not accepted by Prime Minister Thatcher's government. The NATO authorities addressing the question of commands and forces in the Strait will have to be very aware of British sentiments, particularly the Gibraltarians.

- Portuguese command of the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT). NATO recently decided to transfer command of IBERLANT from a US to a Portuguese Vice Admiral. This command position recognizes the political and military contribution of Portuguese naval forces to the alliance, and it also reflects that the Portuguese have a sizable sphere of influence in the Atlantic, including the Azores. Early in the discussions concerning Spanish entry, the question of Spanish interests in the Atlantic, particularly along the African coast to the Canary Islands, gave rise to a suggestion that Spain should alternate command of IBERLANT with Portugal. The Portuguese Defense Minister categorically rejected such an arrangement, and the Foreign Minister repeatedly insisted on "no alteration in command zones affecting Portugal" by threatening to veto any change to the existing IBERLANT command structure.³ The Foreign Minister formally demanded that NATO ensure that Spanish entry not reduce the Portuguese spheres of strategic interest, and the Portuguese press reported that Lisbon considered delaying Spanish entry into NATO over this issue.⁴
- French maritime interests. Although France is not in the NATO integrated military structure, the French sphere of influence includes its coastal waters in the western Mediterranean Sea and the Bay of Biscay. The latter area is essential to the protection of the English Channel. Command of the Biscay Area (BISCLANT) is now

exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic (a major subordinate commander of SACLANT). NATO authorities must carefully integrate the Spanish naval forces into the military structure so as not to complicate the incorporation of the French maritime command in time of war.

- **Greek concerns.** The socialist government of Premier Papandreou of Greece has expressed "fraternal" ties with the Spanish socialists. At the December 1981 NATO ministerial meetings, Greece threatened to veto Spanish membership, and Papandreou reportedly changed his mind at the last minute because of pressure from the American and European representatives.⁵ According to Papandreou, Greece is concerned that Spanish entry will require a redefinition of the command and control arrangements in the Mediterranean, and "we will not accept any change in the naval zone in the Aegean."⁶ Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey probably fear that NATO acceptance of a Spanish role in French coastal waters could set a precedent that might undermine their respective claims in the Aegean Sea.

To encourage the development of members' democratic institutions. The NATO Charter expresses the members' determination "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Further, it commits members to contribute to peace "by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."⁷ As noted above, the danger of a Spanish military *putsch* pervades Spanish politics, and a reversion to a military-controlled government could subvert the NATO Charter.

In this context, after General Evren's takeover of the Turkish government in September 1980, NATO authorities

briefly considered cancelling a NATO exercise in Turkey to signal the concern of the alliance, while Belgium actually withdrew its forces from that exercise to demonstrate its disapproval.⁸ Parliamentary debates on Spanish membership reflect a persistent concern that Spain is vulnerable to a military *putsch*, and these sentiments may influence the political decisions concerning the Spanish role in NATO. The February 1981 attempted coup in Madrid caused more than a ripple of such concern.

To preserve the integrity of NATO. While NATO nations might be uncomfortable with a militarily-controlled member, a far worse eventuality would be the withdrawal of a nation from the alliance. If the Spanish Socialist Party gains control of the Cortes in the next general elections, Chairman Gonzalez has promised to hold a referendum on the NATO issue: "The ballot will not only relate to membership in the integrated military organization but to membership in the Atlantic pact itself."⁹ In a 1981 public opinion poll, nearly 70 percent of the population favored a national referendum on the issue.¹⁰ If current attitudes persist, such a referendum will result in the defection of Spain, causing damage to the alliance far in excess of any temporary benefits accrued from Spain's membership.

To limit costs to the alliance. The NATO budget includes varying amounts of infrastructure funds for the construction of fixed installations required for the deployment and operation of NATO forces, for example, airfields, communications and radar sites, headquarters, fuel storage facilities, and port installations. Obviously, the addition of Spain and its islands to the alliance opens the door to requests for sizable infrastructure funds which will compete with money already approved for other projects throughout Europe. NATO authorities, already under pressure to contain mounting budget increases, may find it difficult to fund legitimate requirements for infrastructure construction in Spain—funding which Spanish officials clearly anticipate.

To develop the capability to combat terrorism. International terrorism has become a growing problem in recent years, as evidenced by attacks on NATO officials and installations, particularly in Germany. The long and bitter Spanish experience with Basque terrorism developed a cadre of military personnel capable of providing advice and assistance to NATO headquarters which is responsible for addressing the terrorist threats to personnel and facilities.

US OBJECTIVES

As NATO's founder, leader, and largest contributor, the United States identifies with most of the NATO interests listed above with some differences in emphasis. The most important US objectives which affect Spain's membership are as follows:

To enhance the capability of the alliance. For more than 30 years, the US defense strategy has centered upon NATO. This focus has continued in recent years: President Carter's fiscal year 1982 budget justified the need for increased defense expenditures, in part, by the requirement "to improve, in cooperation with our NATO allies, the ability of our forces to mobilize quickly and fight effectively in defense of Europe."¹¹ President Reagan's 1983 budget calls for "revitalizing alliances and coalitions to . . . support NATO objectives," and particularly stresses the need for security assistance programs to strengthen the southern flank of NATO.¹² This bipartisan and constant support clearly has solid foundations which will sustain NATO well into its fourth decade. The addition of a sixteenth nation reinforces the significance of the Atlantic alliance in American defense planning.

To prepare for contingencies outside of NATO. The 1979 identification of the Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interest emphasized the US need to improve its capacity to conduct military activities outside of Europe. The inability of NATO to respond effectively to events in Afghanistan and

Poland emphasized the need for the United States to maintain the capability to conduct unilateral operations throughout the world. While Spain, as a member of NATO, may be less lenient in permitting the United States to use Spanish bases in support of national initiatives outside of NATO, it could be a positive influence in focusing alliance interests toward the Arab world and Latin America.

To coordinate the allied response to armed conflicts outside of NATO. The United States experienced severe difficulties in attempting to orchestrate the NATO responses to Soviet initiatives outside the NATO area. Now that Spain has joined the alliance, difficulties may arise between the independent line that country has pursued for many years and efforts of the United States to coordinate NATO positions on a number of issues in the non-NATO areas. Spanish criticism of US policies in El Salvador, and Spanish refusal to endorse the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands, provide two recent examples of Spanish attitudes involving Latin America.

To increase the European share of the NATO burden. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, in his fiscal year 1982 report to the Congress, expanded upon the long-standing US attempt to devise a more equitable burden-sharing formula within NATO:

As the United States assumes most of the military burden in areas outside of but vital to Europe, all the other members of the Alliance must do even more at home ... What FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has called a "division of labor" is the necessary formula for the security and well-being of the Alliance.¹³

In the fiscal year 1983 Defense Department report, Secretary Weinberger continues this theme by both welcoming the allies to do more to complement US military, economic, and political efforts and by specifically asking for facilities and logistics support. The 1983 report also noted the requirement

for NATO members to compensate for the possible diversion of US forces which might be needed to assist in a Rapid Deployment Force operation outside of Europe.¹⁴

In recent congressional testimony, defense analyst Jeffrey Record focused on the mismatch between US strategy and forces available, and suggested that NATO defense planners consider a restructuring of national manpower commitments throughout the alliance. In effect, he proposed an eventual application of the Nixon Doctrine to Europe, with the United States maintaining its presence through naval, air, and nuclear forces and with the allies assuming full responsibility for their own defense on the ground. Although the Reagan administration shows no sign of adopting such an approach, pressures will undoubtedly mount to shift more of the defense burden to European nations.¹⁵

The United States has set a course which encourages the European nations to improve their defense efforts while the United States addresses global as well as European threats. Although Spain's membership theoretically enhances Europe's capacity to take more of the burden, Spain will also have the same problems as other European nations in attempting to increase their military spending levels.

To avoid massive increases in US military assistance. The recent increases in US defense expenditures are aimed primarily toward the strengthening of American strategic and conventional forces, and the levels of military assistance in many cases are dropping. In 1981, when the United States and Spain were renegotiating the 1976 bilateral treaty, Spain pressed for more assistance. The need to modernize and upgrade the Spanish military is even more pronounced today as Spain assumes continental responsibilities. Now that Spain is allied with 15 nations rather than only one, the United States may be in a stronger position to resist continued Spanish requests for increased US military assistance. On the other hand, the United States is clearly identified as Spain's "spon-

sor" in NATO, and the allies will undoubtedly expect the United States to take the leading role in helping to upgrade the Spanish military capabilities.

To better integrate US and NATO war planning. In addition to the elaborate and detailed alliance structure which has evolved over the past three decades, the United States has created a series of bilateral or multilateral relationships which are sometimes conflicting or duplicated. Inclusion of Spain in NATO simplifies and improves US plans, particularly for emergency reinforcement and resupply of Europe. Furthermore, the inclusion of Spanish headquarters and forces in NATO maneuvers will reduce the duplicative requirement for the United States to achieve planning and training objectives through both bilateral as well as NATO exercises.

To protect bilateral relationships with other nations. The United States will have to decide how to approach the sensitive issues between Spain and other countries in a way which avoids upsetting bilateral relationships with various nations both within and outside the alliance. Although America may have been able to sidestep some of these problems in the past, with Spain in NATO the United States must take positions on such questions as sovereignty over Gibraltar and naval control in the Iberian and Biscay areas. Another issue concerns the Spanish enclaves in Morocco. Morocco challenges Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the several coastal islands and towns. If the United States appears sympathetic with the Spanish claims to sovereignty over the enclaves and presses to expand the NATO area, any US efforts to develop base rights agreements with Morocco might suffer.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, NATO and the United States have not precisely specified the various interests which relate to Spain's membership in the alliance. The two sets of objectives developed above are not, therefore, parallel in a way which lends itself to methodical comparison. General patterns, however, are discernible:

Although NATO objectives are bound by the requirement for unanimity among 16 nations, one can argue that the whole alliance is greater than the sum of its parts. NATO can accomplish deterrent and defensive missions which separate nations, working individually toward the same end, would be unable to accomplish. Spanish entry, although disruptive to some degree, can politically and militarily enhance the alliance by adding more to NATO than the magnitude of Spanish resources suggests.

United States' objectives reflect the fact that the United States, which provides the economic and military backbone of the alliance, wants to streamline and refocus defense efforts to respond to Soviet pressures in non-NATO areas. Spain, along with many other NATO members, will probably not be helpful in directly assisting the United States to address problems in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America because Spain shows very little interest in following the US lead in political or military initiatives outside of NATO. In the long run, however, Spanish entry will provide a greater European capacity to conduct a conventional defense against Warsaw Pact aggression, which will allow the United States to divert resources for contingencies elsewhere.

4. SPANISH OBJECTIVES

The 1981 public debate in Spain concerning NATO entry has been useful in revealing Spanish attitudes and motivations involved in accession to the alliance. The objectives which follow reflect not only pronouncements by Spanish officials but also opposing views, which might more accurately reflect popular sentiment and may influence future Spanish foreign policy. These objectives generally fall into five categories: political, territorial, economic, internal, and defense.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

To regain influence in Europe. After a long period of isolation from—and in many cases, condemnation by—modern Europe, Spain yearns to regain its rightful place on the continent. A consistent theme in all Spanish discussions concerning NATO entry has been its desire for acceptance as an important European power and recognition as a modern democratic state. Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo opened the parliamentary debate on NATO accession with the declaration, “we must restore Spain’s international position, which was denied to it for a long time while there was dictatorship in Spain.”¹ Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca stressed that “NATO membership implies breaking away from the tradition of isolation,” and that Spain will be influential in developing the future policies of the entire continent:

We must . . . express our opinion on how to organize the line of defense in Bavaria, what is to be done in the Eastern Mediterranean, what is best for the North Sea, and so

forth. And I hope that this will prompt interest in Spain. Because it would be a sign that this country has become normalized.²

Defense Minister Oliart echoed the same theme in discussing the impact of Spanish entry into NATO:

Spanish foreign policy will witness something very positive because Spain will play its role as a European power . . . In Europe lies the secret of its strength as a state, as a society and as a nation.³

Spain clearly wants and needs the political influence and prestige which that country perceives accompanies NATO membership.

To become more independent of the United States. The perception of Spanish vulnerability to a US-Soviet confrontation helps explain the anti-American sentiments pervading the demonstrations against NATO entry which swept Spain in 1981. Although government-to-government relations are generally warm, Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca was openly critical of the Spanish-US relationship, and charged that the 1976 treaty was "clearly precarious and unsatisfactory and . . . tantamount to satellitization."⁴ Perez-Llorca also suggested that Spain wanted to terminate its bilateral ties with the United States even without NATO entry.⁵ The Foreign Minister further stated that Spain really prefers a purely European defense arrangement to NATO, "and would fight for it, but that it is not possible now."⁶ In addition to the possibility of a superpower clash, the Spanish also resent the United States' support for the Franco regime, as reflected by PSOE leader Gonzalez's accusations:

America helped Europe to free itself from fascism, and it not only did not help Spain but condemned it to dictatorship for many more years. . . . We have little for which to thank the United States, the last country with which we were at war.⁷

Perhaps the most important issue concerns the US bases. Spain, in its bilateral agreements with the United States, maintained the right to disapprove US operations from Spanish territory. Spain exercised this veto during both the 1973 Middle East War, when the Spanish government forbade the United States to use Spanish bases to transship arms to Israel, and the 1979 Iranian crisis, when the government would not permit US F-15s bound for Saudi Arabia to refuel.

At a press conference following a visit to the United States, Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca clearly implied that Spain will now be even more reluctant to support US initiatives. He stated that the military application of the alliance "will be established through relevant negotiations in which the 16 countries of the organization will take part and will not be left to the unilateral decision of the United States."⁸ On another occasion he was more precise:

If we join the Atlantic alliance, clearly the bases will be placed at the service of a specific objective, which is stated in the treaty. The United States will, therefore, cease to have facilities in Spain for a worldwide policy. . . . Unless it is for the defense of Europe and North America, as a member of NATO it will have to ask permission in every individual case.⁹

To promote interests outside of NATO. Spain developed an independent foreign policy approach, particularly toward the Arab countries and Latin America; it has not, for instance, recognized the State of Israel, and Spanish Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo was the first European governmental head to receive the Palestinian Liberation Organization leader, Yasir Arafat. Spain condemned South Africa for its aggression in Angola, recognized the Marxist-oriented Polisario movement in Western Africa, and then endorsed self-determination for that area. Spain also attended the 1979 Havana conference of nonaligned countries and still maintains good relations with Cuba.

For many years, Spain perceived itself as the bridge between Europe and the regions identified above, and its relationships have evolved from cultural and historical ties which have not been unduly shaded by Europe's and America's preoccupation with the Soviet threat.¹⁰ Spain's interest in maintaining and expanding upon these non-NATO affiliations is a theme which emerged repeatedly throughout the Cortes debates on alliance membership. Defense Minister Oliart, for instance, stressed the necessity for "playing roles in Latin America, North Africa and the Arab world—with the countries to which it [Spain] is linked by common history, such as Morocco."¹¹ Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca expanded on this thought and predicted that NATO entry would give Spain

greater weight as an interlocutor. . . . I have found in the Arab countries, with which we maintain manifold relations, an interest in knowing that they have a friend in NATO and a country which has traditionally listened to them sensitively and which maintains good relations with them. Of course, the same applies to the Latin American countries.¹²

During a recent visit to Tunisia, Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo stated that Spain considered itself an ally who will "defend the interests" of Tunisia and the entire region through its membership in the international organizations of the Common Market and NATO.¹³ How far Spain will go in defending the interests of its informal allies is not yet clear, but the Spanish perception of this non-NATO orientation is fundamental to its view of its role in the world.

TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES

To regain sovereignty over Gibraltar. In Spain, few political issues evoke more emotion than the question of Gibraltar; the centuries-old dispute with Britain on the status of this strategically important area frequently emerged during the Spanish debate on NATO entry. The Cortes, in a resolution addressing Spain's entry to NATO, stated "that the recovery

of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar is essential"; thus, the government agreed not to insist on an acceptable solution prior to entry.¹⁴ The January 1982 talks between Prime Ministers Calvo-Sotelo and Thatcher, which resulted in an agreement in principle to open the border, marked a healthy step forward, and it appears the major issue remains the strong opposition to Spanish sovereignty as expressed by the citizens of Gibraltar. On this problem, Calvo-Sotelo said, "the Gibraltarians, being British citizens, could return to Britain."¹⁵

To guarantee protection of the African enclaves. Spain governs Ceuta and Melilla as parts of Cadiz and Almeria provinces and considers these enclaves on the African coast to be integral parts of the country. Spanish sentiments on this question are probably more intense than were French attitudes toward Algeria prior to its independence, and Spain is well aware of the inclusion of Algeria under the original NATO Charter. The Cortes instructed the government on "the need to guarantee the security of the entire national territory, both inside and outside the peninsula."¹⁶ The public debate leading up to this resolution makes it clear that the extrapeninsular territories in question are the enclaves and islands off Morocco's north coast. Defense Minister Oliart indicated that the NATO framework might provide for defense of the enclaves if attacked from the sea, but if threatened from the land, the allies must consult. This speculation presumably rests on the assumption that only the Soviet Union will mount a naval attack, while a ground attack would come from Morocco. He conceded that a specific mention of Ceuta and Melilla in the NATO agreement might "create further tensions."¹⁷ Spain has not publicly pressed for an extension of the NATO boundaries.

To insure Spanish command over maritime areas. Defense Minister Oliart specifically stated what command authority Spain wants within NATO: "exclusive Spanish command over all its territory and adjacent waters, control over the Bay of Biscay, the Balearic area, the Strait of Gibraltar and, of course, the Canary Islands."¹⁸ Similarly, in the Cortes debate,

Defense Minister Oliart stated that Spain would demand command "of the region of the strait, with flanking support in the Balearics and Canaries areas. The Cantabrian area and that of the northwest of the peninsula must also be under Spanish command."¹⁹ Spain is, however, sensitive to Portuguese concerns and indicated that it does not intend for a dispute over Iberian command relationships to cause any problem over NATO entry.²⁰ The resolution of the competing Spanish and Portuguese interests in the Atlantic, as well as the question of Spanish maritime control in the Bay of Biscay, represent difficult problems which are further addressed in chapter 4.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

To improve prospects for entry into the EEC. The 1981 Cortes Resolution, which authorized the Spanish government to apply for NATO membership, started with a declaration of "the desirability of Spain becoming integrated into the political, economic and defense structure of the Western world," and it directed the government to accelerate "negotiations with the EEC ... in parallel with the negotiations within the Atlantic alliance."²¹ The evidence suggests that Spain's interest in joining NATO may have been motivated largely by its need to enter the Common Market, and the government repeatedly made the point that membership in the alliance would be a very positive step toward joining the EEC. Common Market membership, essential for Spain's economic growth, will be considerably less difficult once Spanish military programs become integrated with those of NATO nations, most of which are EEC members.

To strengthen Spain's economy. In addition to improving prospects of joining the EEC, Spaniards perceive that NATO membership itself will bring economic benefits. Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo indicated that Spain will be able to achieve significant improvements in its defense posture by paying "an increase of merely 2 percent in our annual military budget."²² Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca confidently predicted that NATO

membership will cause the United States to increase its capital investment in Spain:

There is a law in the United States which envisages major facilities for granting military aid and cooperation in industrial projects in . . . the Atlantic alliance countries. Therefore, I believe that there is no better bilateral treaty with the United States than a multilateral treaty.²³

Defense Minister Oliart looked at the economic benefits which will accompany European weapons production cooperation and anticipated joining the Eurogroup as part of the process of assimilation into the alliance. He also foresaw "other kinds of compensation . . . such as those concerning the extension or granting of certain licenses for the construction of . . . weapons." Concerning military assistance from the United States, Oliart anticipated "reciprocal technological and military-industrial cooperation for which we are hoping. There is also the matter of the so-called security clause which can be resolved more easily through NATO membership."²⁴ Spain is also demanding a bigger share of the profits which the United States is now earning from arms sales.²⁵

INTERNAL OBJECTIVES

To stabilize Spanish democracy. The threat of a military *putsch* presents probably the greatest single threat to the emerging Spanish democracy. The abortive coup of February 1981, followed by a series of incidents to include the previously-mentioned "Manifesto of 100," strongly suggests that the Spanish political leaders have not been entirely successful in depoliticizing the military. King Juan Carlos himself has voiced his concern about discipline within the armed forces, warning of

actions, which disregarding or bypassing the natural channels of expression and communication, could create conditions of restlessness or disorientation in the military service itself and in the peaceful coexistence of citizens in general. . . .²⁶

In early 1982, the Prime Minister justified his abrupt replacement of the Chairman of the Defense Junta and his Service Chiefs as a change designed to insure continuity and permanence during the NATO accession process.²⁷ At the same time, Defense Minister Oliart expressed his concern about the isolation of the military from society, emphasizing that NATO will help resolve the internal crisis within the armed forces.²⁸ Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca candidly observed that NATO membership implies extricating Spain "from its introspection, Spain's obsession with its own problems. In my opinion, NATO entry is a positive factor in placing our country on stable and normal paths."²⁹ As *Time* magazine's European editor John Nielsen observed, "Spaniards believe the best way to keep the armed forces out of politics would be to bring Spain into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."³⁰

To avoid deployment of nuclear weapons. In 1966 a US B-52 crashed over Spain with 4 hydrogen bombs on board; it took nearly ten weeks to recover all the weapons. Spain immediately banned US nuclear bombers from landing on or flying over Spanish territories and subsequently restricted the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Spain. The 1976 bilateral treaty directed that the American nuclear submarine squadron at the Rota naval base withdraw by mid-1979, and it expressly stated that "the United States will not store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil."³¹ The Spanish express their antinuclear sentiment from time to time at both demonstrations protesting the construction of nuclear power plants and anti-American rallies which occur sporadically throughout the country. Ian Smart, former Director of Research at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, surmised that it is doubtful that Spain will permit national nuclear armaments in the foreseeable future, because "a government of the Left would not, and a government of the Right could not, exercise that option—at least not without a serious risk of dangerous disruption."³²

Yet the signals are mixed. Spain has already acquired nuclear technology and operates 3 nuclear power plants with 19

more under construction or on the drawing boards. Defense Minister Oliart openly declared that since Spain is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it can develop its own atomic bombs if necessary.³³ According to a report attributed to sources in the Spanish Nuclear Energy Council, "Spain has technology and sufficient capability to make 10 atomic bombs a year," but stressed that "such production would presuppose the political will for undertaking a military program of this kind."³⁴

During the Cortes discussion on NATO membership, Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca initially declared, "Under no circumstances will nuclear weapons be deployed or stored in Spain."³⁵ Defense Minister Oliart later explained that "there would be no point in deploying tactical weapons on Spanish territory since such weapons could not reach the Warsaw Pact countries from the peninsula."³⁶ During the course of the national debate, however, a Defense Ministry spokesman indicated that the Spanish Army is interested in medium-range, tactical defensive nuclear weapons, and he complained that the United States seems unwilling to give them to Spain.³⁷ Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo subsequently qualified the Spanish position:

The treaty would not oblige us to have nuclear weapons in the country. The government's feeling favors going on as we are, that is, without nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, . . . we should like to leave this possibility open in case the Cortes should like at some time to have the opportunity to decide the matter.³⁸

With the memory of the US B-52 crash receding and with Spain emerging as an influential European power, its government may eventually reconsider its opposition to nuclear weapons; however, such reconsideration is not imminent, particularly in the wake of spreading antinuclear sentiment throughout Europe.

DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

To enhance Spain's defensive posture. Ironically, security interests were not paramount in Spain's decision to join the alliance. This reflects Spain's relatively secure geographic position and her perception that the Warsaw Pact does not pose a significant threat. Socialist Party Leader Gonzalez probably echoed popular sentiment when he expressed his opposition to NATO: "it would not improve Spain's military security in any way. . . . The strategic interests of Spain, which faces North Africa, do not coincide with those of NATO and may conflict with them."³⁹ Little discussion of security issues occurred during the Cortes debate on Spanish entry, which caused Gonzalez to complain that "there was no confrontation revealing convergence or divergence."⁴⁰ In security terms, the Calvo-Sotelo government essentially perceived NATO entry as a continuation and improvement of Spain's long-standing alliance with the United States. Minister Perez-Llorca explained that "Spain has been aligned with the West *de facto* since 1953. . . . Spain's entry into NATO has a very specific aim of normalizing our defense relationship with the Western world."⁴¹ The Soviet threat hardly emerged as an issue except for Calvo-Sotelo's acknowledgment that the presence of US bases would draw Spain into the conflict:

Joining the alliance would not increase the risk Spain already runs, given that under the bilateral pacts with the United States we have U.S. bases on our territory and there are Soviet SS-20 missiles with nuclear warheads targeted on these.⁴²

Perhaps Defense Minister Oliart best summarized Spain's philosophic acceptance of the realities of international politics when he said,

In view of the Spanish-U.S. treaty and of our strategic geographic position, as well as in view of the broadening of the terrestrial area of modern warfare, in which missiles, satellites and so forth are used—all these factors make it

impossible for us to remain remote from any international conflict, particularly if the future theater is Europe or North Africa.⁴³

Spanish objectives appear to be virtually unrelated to the defensive purposes of the alliance. Joining NATO helps Spain achieve a number of political ends, but the short-term economic costs will probably be greater than Spanish policymakers appear to realize. The NATO issue may also undermine popular support for the Spanish government, particularly the ruling Central Democratic Party, with potentially serious consequences for the future of Spanish democracy. Consequently, so that a framework for determining Spain's role in the alliance can be established, NATO and US policymakers must examine the above objectives in closer detail.

5. SPAIN'S ROLE IN NATO

Diversity within NATO is one of its political underpinnings as well as a source of problems, and it is not surprising that most of the Spanish objectives do not coincide with those of the alliance or of the United States. As the previous chapter suggests, the only broad area of convergence appears to be a mutual willingness to help improve Spain's economy and military capabilities, and to strengthen its democratic institutions.

RESOLUTION OF NATO, US, AND SPANISH INTERESTS

While the various sets of objectives are not necessarily incompatible, in some instances they will cause friction and conflict within the alliance. The most significant areas of potential difficulty are discussed below.

Command Structure

In conceptual terms, Spain and Portugal form a separate region within the alliance, roughly parallel to the position of the United Kingdom. Creation of an "Iberian Command" as a fourth Major NATO Command appears to be a good solution, with roles and missions generally symmetrical with those of CINCHAN. This command would encompass the Iberian land-mass, access routes to the Mediterranean Sea, and the western Mediterranean basin. It would extend into the Atlantic from the Canary Islands and the Azores on the west, and northward to the access to the English Channel at the port city of Brest in Brittany. Primarily maritime in orientation, this Iberian Command would also have land and air roles, and its forces would

include not only those of Spain and Portugal, but also those of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Such a clean arrangement may be politically unacceptable to Portugal, however, and it might also raise objections from France as well as from the Atlantic NATO commanders. In spite of Spain's stated desire for maritime command, its forces must be folded into the existing NATO command structure in some sort of arrangement which does not threaten Portuguese control in Spain's area.

Military Assistance

Vast amounts of NATO funds are not available to flood into Spain's defense budget, and it is unlikely that the United States or other nations will be willing to provide much of the capital needed to upgrade Spanish forces. The alliance will have to commit considerable resources to develop the necessary infrastructure, but this will not improve the capabilities of the Spanish forces.

Spain will gain in some measure from association with the NATO allies and will accrue some economic and military advantages from the development of its arms industries. In the short run, however, Spain will receive some pressure from the alliance to embark upon a major force modernization program, particularly for the Spanish Army. The costs will be significantly higher than the 2 percent increase which Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo predicted. In joining the alliance, Spain essentially committed itself to an expensive force modernization program, the pace and magnitude of which will be a national decision. The alliance will reasonably expect Spain to bring defense spending to the levels of other NATO members, which suggests eventually doubling the proportion of the Spanish GDP now budgeted for defense.

Internal Stability

As indicated above, continued growth as a democracy is a goal shared by NATO and the United States as well as by Spain. A brief look at the records of various other NATO countries, however, shows that the alliance will not seek to terminate Spain's membership in the event of a military *putsch*. General Evren's regime in Turkey presents the current example of NATO's tolerance for a member government that does not mirror the democratic ideals of the Charter; however, this acceptance (in some cases somewhat reluctant) would probably erode without General Evren's pledge to return his government to democratic civilian rule according to a fairly specific timetable.

On the other hand, since NATO members reacted mildly to the independent line followed by Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, they will probably have no difficulty with the membership of the socialist-controlled government in Spain. Even Portugal's communist-dominated government of the mid-1970s retained its membership in the alliance, although it was excluded from nuclear deliberations, and for at least five years, NATO withheld some of its planning documents from Portuguese officials.

The danger is that Spain's socialist government might follow through on PSOE Leader Gonzalez's pledge to conduct a referendum on membership and, if the citizens so choose, to withdraw from the alliance—a move which would be a clear loss to NATO, both politically and militarily.

Security of the Enclaves

To the average Spanish citizen, it may be difficult to explain how NATO enhances the security of the nation; on the contrary, many fear that alliance membership increases Spain's level of risk. For those Spaniards who perceive that the greatest threat to Spanish security stems from the

Moroccan designs to gain sovereignty over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, NATO membership diverts military forces in the wrong direction.

The alliance is beginning to display some sensitivity to non-European events which affect its security. At the same time, NATO is becoming increasingly concerned about the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. A good military case can be made for improving control of the Gibraltar Strait by maintaining forces in the enclaves, particularly Ceuta, for NATO forces complementing each other from both sides of the Strait can effectively block access to the Mediterranean Sea. A deliberate decision to make such a move, however, will stimulate political controversy throughout the alliance, and it will strain relations between Morocco and any nation, particularly the United States, that supported Spanish claims in the enclaves.

The issue is probably best not addressed. Spain currently uses the enclaves for small elements of Spanish forces, and it has the prerogative to station troops there which might be earmarked for NATO missions. Spain would be within its rights to open up those facilities to other forces of the alliance; in fact, such a move would reflect the military cooperation expected from NATO members. It is likely that the deterrent value of even such a minor NATO presence in the enclaves would dissuade Morocco from taking any sudden action against them. Whether or not Morocco would then make a political issue of the situation is an open question; Morocco might decide to avoid possibly stimulating official alliance support for the Spanish claims to ownership of the enclaves.

Non-NATO Interests

Using Spain as a political bridge to non-NATO regions opens up a whole array of options for the alliance. Spain may be able to help articulate European policy to its friends in the Arab and Third Worlds with the possible effect of increasing alliance influence outside of Europe.

Some reactions within NATO may be adverse, however, particularly from nations who perceive their interests threatened by the newest member of "the club." United States officials may want to provide cautious encouragement to Spain's self-assumed role as interlocutor, while recognizing that in some cases, Spain may be presenting views and positions which appear to oppose those of the United States.

Related to this question is Spain's role as a *physical* bridge to non-NATO regions, particularly for the US use of Spanish soil to support operations of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the Persian Gulf area. This will probably remain a bilateral issue for the United States and Spain to address on a case-by-case basis. As Spain continues to emerge from isolation, broaden its interests, and develop a better appreciation of military modernization costs, increased cooperation may occur; in fact, the United States might stimulate such cooperation by offering Spain either more military assistance or other economic incentives.

Nuclear Weapons

United States and NATO planners are undoubtedly discussing nuclear issues with Spanish officials, and Spain has expressed an interest in seeking representation in the key NATO committees, presumably including the Nuclear Planning Group. Military planners will see advantages in using Spanish territory to store and deploy US nuclear weapons, as well as equipping Spain's three services with tactical nuclear weapons. Spanish public opposition is so entrenched, however, that for the foreseeable future Spain will probably be, in effect, a "nuclear-free zone."

Gibraltar

Although resolution of the centuries-old problem of Gibraltar remains a bilateral matter between Spain and the United Kingdom, the creation of a NATO command on the

base risks alliance involvement in the issue. Great Britain might even welcome passing the problem to NATO, which will then find itself in the middle of a "no-win" situation. The fundamental question concerns the status of the citizens of Gibraltar who almost unanimously oppose Spanish citizenship. This problem could create difficulties for NATO if the Gibraltarians perceived that the alliance supported the Spanish claims to sovereignty.

NATO may find it difficult to avoid becoming entangled in the politics of Gibraltar and will have to take an even hand in recognizing both the Spanish claim and the popular sentiments. When the border again opens, and if the Spanish economy steadily improves, Gibraltarian resentment of Spain may diminish.

THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

First Steps

The first impediment to Spain's immediate participation in alliance activities will probably be administrative and bureaucratic. The most basic problem is language.

English and French are the official NATO tongues, and once France withdrew from the military structure, English became predominant in the combined military headquarters. Few Spanish officers are fluent in English, and the language barrier will present a serious short- to mid-term problem in the interaction of Spanish forces with other allies. This will also create delays in the circulation and processing of NATO documents both within Spanish military headquarters and among Spanish officers on NATO staffs.

Additional delays will stem from the need for Spanish military officials to become acquainted with the NATO organization and procedures, a process which will not be quick or easy because of the decades of Spanish isolation. To address this,

as well as the language problem, NATO established a course tailored for Spanish military personnel at the NATO School in southern Germany. This course, structured to include basic alliance military terminology, as well as allied organization, doctrine, and procedures, will probably be taught in Spanish.

Early Military Cooperation

Even before the above problems are resolved, Spain can participate in many ongoing activities of the alliance. Because some Spanish personnel have worked with American counterparts or attended defense schools in the United States, a core of English-speaking officials exists. Spain can assign some of these to the appropriate political and military headquarters of the alliance to include those of the three major NATO commands as well as the subordinate commands of SACLANT and CINCSOUTH.

As already noted, Spain participated, to a limited extent, in some allied exercises, particularly with the United States, Portugal, and France; thus Spain can immediately incorporate elements of its forces in scheduled NATO maneuvers. Planning for and participating in these activities is an excellent tool for integration. The degree of interaction will be extremely limited at first, but it will expand as the education process develops. Candidate exercises would include the autumn maritime maneuvers scheduled by SACLANT and CINCSOUTH, to which Spanish air elements can provide some support. Spanish forces might also participate in the Central Region air exercises.

Spain can join the semi-annual activations of the Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED), which currently includes a ship from each nation with a Southern Region role such as Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Spanish ships can also maneuver with SACLANT's Standing Naval Force, Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which normally includes ships from six to nine of the Atlantic and North Sea nations.

Including Spanish ground forces in NATO activities might be more difficult to arrange, partly because such participation would not be effective unless it were in support of contingency plans. Low-level tactical training, which already occurs between Spain and Portugal, might be scheduled in conjunction with allied activities in the various training areas in Italy and Germany. Additionally, Spanish observers should attend the major NATO and national exercises, particularly those which are included in SACEUR's "Autumn Forge" series.

The integrated NATO system is already incorporating Spanish air defenses, which is an important step toward an improved defense posture for the alliance; further enhancements—such as basing AWACS in Spain and tightening Spanish-French air defense cooperative arrangements—will undoubtedly follow. NATO authorities might also consider tying the Canary and Balearic Islands into the coordinated air defense net, as well as possibly using the Spanish enclaves in Africa as radar sites to extend the early warning system.

Another area of early military cooperation is in the field of counterterrorism. All three Spanish military services, particularly the army, have been involved in the efforts to stem the ETA terrorist activities in the Basque provinces. Spanish officials can share with officials of other nations encountering similar difficulties their experiences and tactical approaches to terrorism. Such assistance can range from providing advice to actually deploying specially-trained units to areas where terrorist activity is particularly intense. Spanish counterterrorist capabilities, combined with those of other allies who have addressed terrorism, can provide the potential to develop a NATO capacity to deal with this growing threat to European security.

Command Arrangements


In general terms, since the concept of a separate "Iberian Command" is politically infeasible, Spain will essentially orient itself toward SACLANT for its maritime roles in the Atlantic,

and toward SACEUR for its ground and air roles, air defense, and naval activities in the Mediterranean. The chart and map (figures 2 and 3) provide a logical way to divide these commands, although political compromises and arguments over "turf protection" may well make some other division more attractive.

In the Atlantic area, SACLANT will probably be deeply involved in sorting out any conflict between Lisbon and Madrid, since the ocean area between Spain and the Canary Islands cuts into the existing IBERLANT Command. Rather than carving a slice from CINCIBERLANT's area, organizing an island command, similar to the existing commands for the Bermudas, the Azores, and the Madeiras, is a preferable arrangement. Although all island commands currently answer to subordinate commanders of SACLANT, the Spanish island commander might have the authority to respond directly to SACLANT to preclude problems in Spanish-Portuguese command relationships.

In the Bay of Biscay, Spain should play a key role in BISCLANT, perhaps assuming that command from CINCEASTLANT. Again, SACLANT will be involved in defining the relationships between the major players, which in this case requires coordination between Madrid and London. To a lesser extent, French concerns affect this command structure. While French forces will probably continue to avoid a formal role in the military commands, participation in naval exercises will facilitate the incorporation of those forces into the maritime structure during a war.


SACEUR should control, through CINCSOUTH, the immediate Atlantic access routes to the Mediterranean and to the Gibraltar straits. Assuming that the United Kingdom and Spain agree to establish the base at Gibraltar as a NATO facility, it appears logical to form a naval command, probably under a Spanish admiral with a British deputy, as a subordinate command under CINCSOUTH. The area of responsibility,



1 CINCEASTLANT now commands BISCLANT

2 COMNAVVSOUTH Now Directly Responsible for MEDOC

CURRENT



Nationality of Commander indicated as follows:
 PO Portuguese
 SP Spanish
 UK United Kingdom
 US United States

PROPOSED

Figure 2: Current and Proposed NATO Organizational Relationships Relating to Spain

extending east into the western Mediterranean, will include the Balearic Islands, the southern French coast, and naval shipping routes between Spain and Sardinia. As in the Biscay Command, NATO will protect French interests to facilitate assimilation in time of war.

Referring to Figure 3, this maritime command would logically have its western boundary on a line extending directly south from the Spanish-Portuguese border, necessitating an adjustment of the present ACE-ACLANT boundary which presently follows the coast lines of Spain and Africa to Gibraltar. The eastern border would be best defined on a line extending south from the French-Italian border, so the Spanish command would essentially encompass the existing Gibraltar-Mediterranean (GIBMED) Command, as well as the Western Mediterranean Command (MEDOC) area.

Some Spanish land forces, parallel to the existing NATO land commands such as Greece, Italy, and Turkey, might be incorporated into the CINCSOUTH structure as another subordinate command and be designated "Land Forces, Southwest." Initially, the Spanish ground forces will have no NATO role other than territorial defense. As Spanish officials have suggested, however, these units can eventually assume reinforcement or strategic reserve missions for CINCSOUTH. Identifying the Portuguese brigade, already deployed to Italy on exercises, with any new Iberian land command is a desirable arrangement. This will open the way for Portugal to share with the Spanish army some of its working experience in Allied Command, Europe (ACE) and will create better multinational representation within the otherwise primarily Spanish headquarters. Because of political sensitivities, however, it is probably not advisable to tighten the ACE-Portuguese relationships at this time.

Most of the Spanish air forces can assume a NATO role as a numbered Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) within AFSOUTH. The Spanish ATAF's mission will reflect support for Spain's naval forces and territories in the Atlantic, and

command arrangements between CINCSOUTH and SACLANT will be rather complex. NATO missions, beyond air support for the Spanish land and naval forces, will probably be quite limited but should evolve as Spain becomes involved in Southern Region, and perhaps Central Region, planning and exercises.

Spanish Bases

Discussions in the Cortes revealed no Spanish opposition to transforming the US air and naval bases in Spain into NATO bases. While initially only US and Spanish forces will be stationed there, as time passes, some British and German air and naval units will probably arrive, and during exercises, forces of other nations can use these bases. Additionally, American CONUS-based ground reinforcements can develop storage facilities for prepositioned unit equipment, although the costs involved in establishing and maintaining such equipment might be economically prohibitive. Eventually, maintenance and logistic depots, as well as hospitals and other rear area installations, are among the facilities which NATO and national authorities, with the agreement of Spain, can consider constructing on Spanish bases.

Another option for consideration is the improvement of existing Spanish training areas and the development of new ones for the use of both air and ground units. The Bardenas Reales firing range is perhaps better than any similar facility in the alliance, and it can be used as an impact area for allied artillery and missile units as well as aircraft. Spain has much potential for identifying maneuver areas for use of ground units which might be deployed into similar terrain in Greece or Turkey. Additionally, NATO has a severe need for an area to exercise the ACE Mobile Force (AMF) in practicing its southern region contingencies, and Spain might be willing to allow AMF exercises on its territory.

LONGER-RANGE POSSIBILITIES

Allied Command, Europe Mobile Force (AMF) Participation

Inclusion of Spanish ground and air elements in the AMF presents a fairly inexpensive opportunity to show the Spanish flag. Spain can commit an airborne infantry company, an artillery battery, and a fighter squadron to both the southern and northern contingents of the AMF. Although such a commitment will not add very much to the combat potential of NATO, the political value of Spanish inclusion in the AMF will be considerable, both to Spain and to the alliance. Additionally, the increased contact between Spain and the other members of the AMF, as well as with the nations where Spanish forces exercise, will help accelerate full Spanish incorporation into the alliance.

Reinforcement Forces

Spanish ground forces, numbering over a quarter of a million, are probably excessive for its defense needs—particularly with the guarantee of the alliance. The Army can equip and train an airborne brigade for combat deployment into the western Mediterranean area. The most obvious role for these forces would be to reinforce NATO units engaged in combat operations in northeast Italy, Greece, or Turkey.

Possible deployment of Spanish reinforcements into the Central Region will be more of a problem. With units from five nations already assigned to the German front, infusion of Spanish troops would cause complications which might tend to outweigh their military value. The possibility of deploying Spanish divisions to replace diverted American forces which were earmarked or assigned to NATO is an idea worth studying.

In addition to the requirement to equip and train the Spanish soldiers for such reinforcement missions, the alliance must

address the transportation requirements. Other than the capability to move a sizable marine force, Spain has very little potential to move its troops. The Spanish defense budget will obviously not stretch far enough to develop sufficient airlift or sealift assets to move division-sized elements. Lines-of-communication problems will also complicate such a deployment, particularly if no forward elements are based in the contingency areas.

Forward-Stationed Units

As the preceding paragraph suggests, any realistic deployment plan will require the peacetime establishment of lines of communication essential to support forces in combat. Spanish personnel should join the staffs of the major NATO and national headquarters where their troops might deploy to initiate war planning and to address the various support problems.

Economic problems might cause a reduction in the size of the Turkish army; such a development can seriously aggravate the vulnerability of the southeastern flank of NATO. Spanish units, particularly those with fairly recent experience in North Africa, might be well suited for deployment into eastern Turkey. A permanent Spanish presence in Turkey will create some logistic requirements normally borne by the host nation. The alliance will have to address this problem and probably work out an arrangement for other nations to share the financial burden.

Internal UK or US pressures can force troop reductions in Germany. Such unilateral withdrawals will create gaps in the Central Region which Spanish forces might occupy in peacetime. Depending on the development of the Spanish army during the next decade, as much as an entire Spanish corps can conceivably replace (or augment) one of the US corps or the British Army of the Rhine. Host nation responsibilities will not

present as formidable a problem for Germany as for Turkey, and such support would probably be no more expensive than costs currently incurred by Germany in support of American forces.

Spanish Basing for US Reinforcements

An alternative to the possibility of eventual reductions of US forces from Europe will be the relocation of some American troops from Germany to Spain. Even with a continuation of the present commitment to Germany, a forward movement of reinforcement divisions from America to Spain would simplify the considerable problems and expense of strategic airlift, and it would improve the US deployment time. Any savings in transportation costs would probably be offset, however, by the requirement to construct adequate billets, training areas, and support facilities. United States planners might want to establish Spain as a "short tour area" without dependents in order to avoid massive expenditures for housing areas, schools, commissaries, and all the other requirements to sustain American family life.

Because the stationing of US units in Spain would be primarily for the defense of European nations other than Spain, the United States probably cannot expect the Spanish to share base construction costs. Furthermore, the Spanish government might be hesitant or unable to provide the requisite political approval to host large numbers of allied troops. The bilateral negotiations leading up to such a decision would be in the context of military and economic benefits to Spain, and the United States might find itself paying more for additional base rights than would be justified by the gains. A less ambitious approach would be to deploy small forward elements of American-based ground forces to Spain and develop contingency plans to use Spain as a staging area for reinforcing divisions in wartime.

The time frame for the possibilities discussed in this chapter would vary: some actions are already underway, while

other improvements are many years away. If the most recent accession of a nation to NATO, that of Germany in 1955, can serve as an example, Spanish integration will not be complete until the early 1990's. Any really significant improvement to the allied combat potential will be slow in coming and will be expensive. Thus, an assessment of Spain's impact on the war-fighting capability of the alliance concludes this study.

6. THE IMPACT OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP

The degree to which Spanish membership will affect the alliance is impossible to quantify. Although its forces and weapons can now be tallied along with those of the rest of NATO, Spanish military assets are not massive enough to create any appreciable shift in the East-West balance. In a realistic sense, virtually no change to the balance has occurred because Spain has actually been in the Western camp almost since the creation of NATO.

As a member of the alliance, Spain will be able to influence the way NATO deals with the rest of the world. Spain's self-image as a bridge to Arab countries and Latin America can complement US efforts to address the non-NATO problems. Spain can also help to circumvent the resentment and resistance with which many nations react to American initiatives and can also provide some insights into the perceptions of non-European countries. The Spanish role of interlocutor will probably not mark any breakthrough in resolving the non-NATO issues but, in tone and emphasis, the Spanish contribution can be useful in the dialogue between the alliance and the external world.

Spain's impact upon the internal problems of NATO as identified in the first chapter will be small and, in some cases, not altogether positive:

Spain will probably not offer any relief for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force issue. The anti-nuclear sentiment in Spain is so well entrenched that Spain will probably not allow US nuclear weapons on its soil, at least through this decade.

Furthermore, Spanish officials may transmit this popular opposition at the NATO conference tables, making any progress on this nuclear issue more difficult to achieve.

Similarly, Spain will probably not support possible future US desires to deploy the enhanced radiation blast weapons in Europe. Although Spanish territory is essentially exempt from the feared ravages of a theater nuclear war, vivid Spanish memories of its own civil war, as immortalized by Picasso's famous "Guernica," will probably push Spain to oppose a unilateral American decision concerning the neutron bomb.

The depth which Spain provides to the European theater appears to make the conduct of a conventional war more feasible. An immediate result may be the emergence of a fundamental question concerning NATO strategy: now that NATO's armies have theoretically increased their capability to maneuver to the rear and to use the Spanish terrain to mount a decisive counterattack, is a strict forward defense policy still appropriate? The addition of Spain may not be great in terms of actual war-fighting capability, but that country's presence may open the door to some new strategic thinking and a healthy relook at the doctrine of flexible response.

In the long run, Spain can help counteract the trend toward reduction of NATO forces by providing troops for various contingencies. This will help create a better political climate for possible US troop diversions to non-NATO areas such as Southwest Asia. In the eventuality of possible American or British force reductions in Germany, the potential for the forward stationing of Spanish units creates an alternative to an otherwise very unstable force ratio on the Central Front. Similarly, Spanish forces can deploy to Turkey in an effort to help reduce the defense burden on the beleaguered Turkish economy. These possibilities will depend on a major modernization program for the Spanish army, which is not yet contemplated and may be economically prohibitive. At best, such

improvements are a decade away. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Spain, which perceives threats to be more from the south than the east, will be willing to make sizable force deployments to Germany or Turkey.

Spanish contributions may marginally improve the achievement of some of NATO's Long-Term Defense Program objectives. The Spanish navy has limited mine and counter-mine capabilities; Spain's 1.5 million-man reserve force is a sizable addition to the reservoir of the alliance; and its bases offer considerable capability to store munitions and supplies. Because the LTDP was expressly tailored to identify specific deficiencies of the members of NATO in 1978, assets which Spain might provide will not necessarily relieve other nations' responsibilities to continue improving their weaknesses. In that light, Spanish membership has very little impact on the LTDP; in fact, Spanish force deficiencies, particularly in its army, may constitute additional areas for the alliance to identify in its continuing assessment and updating of the LTDP.

The degree of host nation support which the United States receives from its allies may be minimal in the case of Spain. Both new requirements for force improvements and continued attempts at economic growth for Spain will work against any enthusiasm to bear the costs for new construction and other support for possible American deployments to Spain. On the contrary, Spain will probably constitute a major drain on the NATO infrastructure budget, which is already underwritten in large part by the United States. A substantial American investment will be necessary to exploit the potential offered by Spain for rear area installations and additional troop deployments.

In the short run, Spain's presence in NATO may exacerbate the problems which already threaten the cohesion of the Southern Flank. France will probably be uncomfortable with the Spanish naval role, and whatever decisions NATO makes concerning that role cannot only alienate Portugal but can

also undermine the Aegean claims of either Greece or Turkey. Furthermore, as Spain begins to extend its influence in Europe, Spanish involvement can destabilize the tenuous balance which SACEUR and CINCSOUTH have attempted to maintain between the two Eastern Mediterranean allies. In the long run, however, the inclusion of Spain will likely assist in providing an important link between the allied commands in Europe and the Atlantic, and it will help redress the geographic void created by the partial defection of France 15 years ago. Because Spain will facilitate the European dialogue with North Africa and the Arab World, the Spanish presence in NATO will eventually assist in addressing the most likely area of confrontation between the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

In quantifiable terms, Spain provides very few immediate gains to the war-fighting capability of NATO. Most of Spain's military forces and economic assets cannot be promptly translated into combat strength for the alliance, and Spanish membership may, in fact, create a short-term drain on allied resources. In geopolitical terms, however, the addition of Spain is unquestionably a gain to NATO. Spain enters after a particularly troubled period, and NATO in mid-1982 appears to be a little more robust, partly because growth suggests health. The alliance now reflects a more united Europe, and the strategic depth afforded by Spain improves the deterrent posture of NATO. Furthermore, allied planners now have a few more options available as they begin to address the growing military and political pressures which Europe and America will face in the late 1980's.

EPILOGUE

This study reflects the situation in June 1982, when Spain formally joined the alliance and attended its first NATO ministerial conference in Brussels. Up to this time, political sensitivities prevented NATO military planners from addressing the Spanish role in the alliance. As an academic research effort, this monograph was not encumbered by such constraints, and hopefully it presents some facts and ideas which may be used in incorporating Spain into NATO.

However, projecting internal events in Spain is difficult. The fledgling democracy has already experienced nearly 7 turbulent years, beset by serious economic problems and political crises caused by extremists on both the right and the left. The forthcoming national elections cast a shadow on the future of Spain's NATO membership itself, and as pointed out in chapter 5, Spain's withdrawal from NATO would cause damage to the alliance far in excess of any potential gains. A short-term requirement for allied planners is, therefore, to integrate Spain as quickly as possible so that its citizens and leaders will appreciate the benefits accrued from association with this organization of free, democratic nations.

The process of full integration will not be smooth or easy. Spain's full assimilation will create political and economic problems for itself, for its neighbors, for the United States, and for NATO. The eventual result can be, however, a major milestone in the evolution of European military cooperation and political integration.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1982/1983* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 131.
2. John M. Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980), pp. 122-125. Also see Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. II-11.
3. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1982): 753-768.
4. US, Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 78.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1982/1983*, p. 44.
7. See, for instance, Justin Galen (pseud.), "Turkey as a Self-Inflicted Wound: The Narrowing Options for a US Defense Policy," *Armed Forces Journal International* 117 (June 1980): 71-72.

CHAPTER 2

1. Accounts of Spain's wavering between neutrality and "nonbelligerency" in the early World War II years are plentiful, and a good summary is found in Stanley G. Payne, *Spain and Portugal*

(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp. 684–686. A more complete treatment is in C. B. Burdick, *Germany's Military Strategy and Spain in World War II* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968). Also see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 53–63.

2. The 1951 Senate approval for sending US troops to NATO included a request for the administration to consider using the military resources of Spain (97 *Congressional Record*, 82d Congress, 1st Session, p. 3095); the US and Spain signed their first bilateral agreement, the Pact of Madrid, two years later.

3. For a knowledgeable treatment of Spain's geopolitical significance, see Leandro Penas, *Spain and the Defense of Europe: A Geopolitical Perspective* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Fort Leavenworth Press, 1979).

4. These percentages were derived from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1982/1983*, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), pp. 29–44. They include all NATO countries except Canada, Iceland, and the United States.

5. Claire Sterling, in *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), pp. 172–201, provides a good insight into the Basque ETA terrorist activities. In addition to the well-publicized incidents of Basque terrorism, plebiscites in the provinces of Catalena and Galica have demonstrated public preference for autonomy. For a basic, albeit somewhat dated, discussion of the complex nature of Spain's population in the context of military relations with the alliance, see Arthur P. Whitaker, *Spain and Defense of the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 85–118.

6. US, Department of State, *Background Notes* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980). Spain and three other NATO nations are categorized by the OECD as "developing." The other three, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, have literacy rates ranging from 56 percent to 84 percent.

7. *El Pais* (Madrid), 20 October 1981, as reported by *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereafter *FBIS*), vol. VII., n. 206 (26 October 1981). Note: all citations of Spanish language broadcast and

other sources are taken from *FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service)*.

8. Madrid Domestic Service, 4 December 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 234 (7 December 1981).

9. Madrid radio, 10 January 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 6 (11 January 1982).

10. *El Pais* (Madrid), 13 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 20 (29 January 1982). Also see R. N. Tannahill, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 77-79.

11. *Economist* (London), 14 November 1981, p. 57.

12. Estimates of Spain's GDP range from \$192 billion in 1981 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1982/1983*, p. 42) to \$227 billion in 1980 (US, Department of Commerce, *Marketing in Spain*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). This monograph relies on *Military Balance, 1982/1983* figures for purposes of comparison but quotes US government figures if they are more current. All comparative rankings exclude Iceland but include France, although it is not in NATO's integrated military structure.

13. US, Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). Natural gas discoveries, reported in November 1981, indicate that Spain may become one of the most important natural gas producers in Western Europe. Madrid Domestic Service, 12 November 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 220 (16 November 81).

14. A good summary of Spain's industrial defense potential is in J. Sanchez Mendez, "Spain and its Defense Organization, Part 2: The Defense Industry," *International Defense Review* 13 (1980): 103-110.

15. For a discussion of the 3-stage process leading toward Spain's EEC entry on 1 January 1984, see the *Economist* (London), 17 April 1982, pp. 64-65.

16. Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is drawn from Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for Spain* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 351-368, and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1982/1983*. For a fairly current discussion of Spanish military capabilities, see J. Sanchez Mendez, "Spain and its Defense Organization, Part 1: The Armed Forces," *International Defense Review* 12 (1979): 1489-1494.

17. *El Pais* (Madrid) 26 February 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 44 (5 March 1982).

18. John Moore, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981/1982* (New York: Jane's Publishing, Inc., 1981), pp. 403-406. Also, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1982/1983*, p. 43.

19. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Future of US Maritime Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980), p. 138.

20. US-Spanish F-18 negotiations reportedly ran into trouble in early 1982 when the Pentagon suggested a two-thirds price increase (to nearly \$1.5 million per plane), causing Spain to consider the less expensive F-16 or Mirage options. *Washington Post*, 22 January 1982, p. A-8.

21. Air Vice Marshal Stewart Menaul, "Spain's Combat Grande," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest* (March 1978), pp. 14-15.

22. Associated Free Press (Paris) 3 November 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 213 (4 November 1981).

23. *El Pais* (Madrid) 6 December 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 237 (10 December 1981).

24. For a brief discussion of Spanish military attitudes, see F. R. Stevens, Jr., "Spain and NATO: Problems and Prospects," *Air University Review* XXXI (March-April 1980): 9-11.

25. For an analysis of the extent of US commitment to Spain see Terry L. Deibel, *Commitment in American Foreign Policy* (National Security Affairs Series Monograph 80-4), (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1980), pp. 45-46, 63-67.

CHAPTER 3

1. For a discussion of NATO's shortfall in merchant shipping, see *The Future of US Maritime Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980), pp. 134–143; also see Isaac Kidd, "For Want of a Nail: The Logistics of the Alliance," in Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *NATO: The Next Thirty Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 194–195.

2. All NATO and Warsaw Pact nations signed the Final Act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Conducted in the spirit of detente, the conference included observers from North Africa and specifically called on Mediterranean-region nations to contribute to peace, reduce armed forces, lessen tensions, and widen the scope of cooperation. ("Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act," *US Department of State Bulletin LXXIII* (1 September 1975), p. 339.) The accords also preserve for each signatory "the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance" (*ibid.*, p. 324).

3. Lisbon Domestic Service, 7 September 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 173 (8 September 1981). *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon) 21 December 1978, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 8 (13 January 1982). See also Lisbon Domestic Service, 21 March 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 57 (24 March 1982). Note: all citations of Spanish language broadcast and other sources are taken from *FBIS* (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service*).

4. Madrid Domestic Service, 20 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 14 (21 January 1982).

5. *Economist* (London), 12–18 December 1981, p. 47.

6. *Financial Times* (London), 24 February 1982, p. 2.

7. "Preamble and Article 2," *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington, DC, 1949.

8. *Washington Post*, 16 September 1980, p. A-19.

9. *Le Monde* (Paris), 27 November 1981, p. 5, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 233 (4 December 1981).

10. *El Pais* (Madrid), 20 October 1981, p. 13, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 206 (26 October 1981).

11. Executive Office of the President, *Budget of the US Government, FY 82* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 95.

12. Executive Office of the President, *Budget of the US Government, FY 83* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 5-11, 5-24.

13. US, Department of Defense, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 63.

14. US, Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. III-111. See also section on "defense burden sharing," *ibid.*, pp. III-120-122.

15. Testimony of Jeffrey Record before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 20 May 1982.

CHAPTER 4

1. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 208 (28 October 1981). Note: all citations of Spanish language broadcast and other sources are taken from *FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service)*

2. *ABC* (Madrid), 5 September 1981, pp. 12-15, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 181 (18 September 1981).

3. *Ad-Dustur* (London), 24 August 1981, pp. 32-33, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 167 (28 August 1981).

4. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 1 September 1981, pp. 3-4, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 178 (14 September 1981).

5. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981.

6. Madrid Domestic Service, 6 October 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 194 (7 October 1981).

7. *Ya* (Madrid), 1 November 1981, pp. 6-7, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 221 (17 November 1981).
8. Madrid Radio, 26 September 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 187 (28 September 1981).
9. *ABC* (Madrid), 5 September 1981.
10. For a good background discussion on Spain's perception of itself as a "bridge," see Whitaker, *Spain and the Defense of the West*, pp. 320-350.
11. *Ad-Dustur* (London), 24 August 1981.
12. *ABC* (Madrid), 5 September 1981.
13. *L'Action* (Tunis), 23 December 1981, p. 6, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 12 (19 January 1982).
14. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 9 October 1981, pp. 3-4, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 201 (19 October 1981).
15. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 209 (29 October 1981).
16. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 9 October 1981.
17. *El Pais* (Madrid), 4 September 1981, p. 10, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 181 (18 September 1981).
18. *Ibid.*
19. Madrid Radio, 27 October 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 208 (28 October 1981).
20. Lisbon Radio, 4 January 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 2 (5 January 1982).
21. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 9 October 1981.
22. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981.
23. *ABC* (Madrid), 5 September 1981.

24. *El Pais* (Madrid), 4 September 1981.
25. Madrid Domestic Service, 15 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 11 (18 January 1982).
26. Madrid Domestic Service, 16 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 11 (18 January 1982).
27. Madrid Domestic Service, 14 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 10 (15 January 1982).
28. Madrid Domestic Service, 6 January 1982, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 6 (11 January 1982).
29. *ABC* (Madrid), 5 September 1981.
30. John Nielsen, "Spain's Fragile Democracy," *Europe* 225 (May/June 81): 36.
31. "Supplementary Agreement on Facilities, Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation (1976)," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 27 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977): 3034-3035.
32. Ian Smart, "European Nuclear Options," in *NATO: The Next Thirty Years*, p. 124.
33. Madrid Radio, 9 November 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 217 (10 November 1981).
34. *Ibid.*
35. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 1 September 1981.
36. *El Pais* (Madrid), 4 September 1981.
37. *El Pais* (Madrid), 21 October 1981, p. 16, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 215 (6 November 1981).
38. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981.
39. *Le Monde* (Paris), 27 November 1981, p. 5, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 233 (4 December 1981).

40. *Ya* (Madrid), 1 November 1981.

41. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 6 October 1981, p. 7, as reported by *FBIS*, vol. VII, n. 201 (19 October 1981).

42. Madrid Domestic Service, 28 October 1981.

43. *Ad-Dustur* (London), 24 August 1981.

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